Too many captains to stay the course

■ The MR party made the presidency of the regional executive revolve between Messrs. de Donnea, Ducarme, and Simonet (here in 2000). ► Brussels Region, assessment of a legislative term (IV/V): the political context. ► The MR Minister-Presidents danced at a surreal pace and under surreal conditions. ► The permanent PS-MR duel tarnished the Region's image and undermined the majority's record. ANALYSIS PASCAL SAC Even those most attached to Brussels institutions are forced to admit it: the Capital-Region has lost a legislative term. From 1999 to 2004, the regional government failed to fully take advantage of a conjunction of positive factors: a brief economic recovery at the turn of the century; a slight institutional opening at the very beginning of the mandate; a temporary improvement in the residential real estate market(*); a general resurgence of urban activity (Brussels 2000, Zinneke Parade, Roller Parade, Brussels-Plage...); remobilization of various municipalities. A favorable context Since its creation in 1989, the Brussels Region had never known such a favorable context. But the majority (MR, PS, SP.A-Groen!, CD&V, VLD) was unable to capitalize on these elements to boost the urban renewal initiated under the first legislature, from 1989 to 1995. It even proved incapable of taking credit for this renewal and, a fortiori, of promoting it to restore the Region's reputation. Result: the legislative term ends with record unemployment, a new surge in housing prices, and a reputation as a poorly managed, even unmanageable, Region. A poor report card, even though the government worked hard – sometimes very well – in many sectors: heritage protection, environment, urban planning, housing, taxation, employment, research, renovation of public spaces, foreign trade, public transport, revitalization of vulnerable areas, economy, etc. But the potential achievements it could have claimed were tarnished by two elements: the surreal merry-go-round of MR Minister-Presidents and the quarrels between the PS and MR. Lamentable vagaries The MR is largely responsible for the failure because, in 1999, it had obtained leadership both in the Regional Council (27 elected representatives out of 75), in the majority (27 MR, 13 PS, 2 SP-Aga, 2 VLD-VU-O, 3 CD&V) and within the government (3 MR, 2 PS, 1 CD&V, 1 VLD, 1 SP), of which it held the presidency. But it made poor use of this function, which was supposed to ensure the coherence of regional policies. Indeed, it imposed repeated and improvised reshuffles. From the outset, Jacques Simonet, the first incumbent, took office with a handicap: appointed at the last minute, he had to assume a majority agreement in the elaboration of which he had played no role since it had been negotiated by Armand De Decker, who eventually became president of the Senate. Installed on July 15, 1999, Mr. Simonet was removed on October 17, 2000, the day after the municipal elections, and asked to take up the mayor's seat he had just won in Anderlecht. This was so that the MR could re-employ François-Xavier de Donnea, who had just been ousted from the mayoralty of Brussels-City. Mr. de Donnea presided over the regional executive until June 4, 2003. After the legislative elections, he was ousted by the MR president, Daniel Ducarme. The self-proclaimed Minister-President was then forced to resign on February 12, 2004, after the press revealed his tax irregularities. Mr. Simonet was then recalled and forced to abandon the federal secretary of state position obtained on July 15, 2003... Due to lack of time, involvement, or credibility, the three MR Minister-Presidents were unable to establish themselves as "bosses" of the Brussels executive. A deplorable climate By acting this way, the MR gave the PS a stick to beat it with. And the latter missed no opportunity to use it during a legislative term marked by permanent confrontation, with the president of the Brussels PS, Philippe Moureaux, in the role of the bogeyman. It must be said that the union of socialists and liberals was not born under the best auspices: they had already clashed head-on from 1995 to 1999; the PS was tense because it had lost Charles Picqué, its emblematic leader; the MR and PS leaders of the executive, Jacques Simonet and Eric Tomas, clashed for the mayoralty of Anderlecht... The overthrow of certain municipal coalitions in 2000 had further deteriorated the climate. And fundamentally, even if socialists and liberals denied it, the left-right ideological conflict left its mark, sometimes caricatural, on the past five years in many areas: tax reform, housing policy, business aid, employment, solidarity between municipalities, revitalization of vulnerable neighborhoods, water management, etc. Deprived of a real captain, the regional government played "personally": each minister, or at least each political faction of the executive, mainly tried to push through "their" projects, without much concern for the overall vision. Or even without caring at all. This led to pathetic bargaining, with each blocking the "opponent's" files to get their own passed. Consequently, the opposition very often found itself observing from the sidelines the debates tearing the majority apart, despite the constant efforts of the CDH and Ecolo to lead constructive opposition. And despite their frequent calls for more responsibility within the majority, whose behavior, according to them, harmed the credit and interests of the Region. In the end, a sign that the divorce was final, the PS and MR ministers even presented separate assessments last week. ■ (*) These different aspects will be explored in depth throughout this week. The highs ► THE COMMUNITY CLIMATE REMAINED QUITE SERENE within the Brussels majority, despite opportunities for serious incidents. ► THE LEFT-RIGHT IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDE WAS CLEAR on several concrete issues, and thus enlightening for all those who do not understand it or consider it outdated. ► THE DYNAMICS INITIATED UNDER THE FIRST LEGISLATIVE TERM CONTINUED ITS MOMENTUM, despite the lack of coherent relaunch to sustain it. ■ The lows ► THE SURREAL MERRY-GO-ROUND OF MR MINISTER-PRESIDENTS DEVALUED THE IMAGE of the Brussels Region in the Belgian institutional landscape. ► THE ALMOST PERMANENT CONFRONTATION BETWEEN PS AND MR prevented the regional government from reaching creative compromises, which, however, sometimes seemed within reach. ► THE BRIEF ECONOMIC RECOVERY WAS NOT AT ALL UTILIZED to get more Bruxellois back to work. ■